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COMMENT
LIABILITY FOR OIL TANKER SPILLS
by Amy McKaig
I. INTRODUCTIONT"HE Amoco Cadiz,' the Exxon Valdez 2 and the near disaster of the
Mega Borg3 remind us of the dangers inherent in the transportation
of crude oil.4 Even domestic oil often is found in remote areas and
must be shipped in order to be processed and used.5 Although large-scale oil
spills such as the eleven million gallon Exxon Valdez and the near spill of the
thirty-three million gallons of the Mega Borg grab headlines, a vast amount
of oil is spilled a little bit at a time. For example, between January and
August of 1990, one million gallons of oil from small spills were released
into the waters of New Jersey alone.6
Given no drastic change in the United States' economy or populace, the
large scale shipping of crude oil and its attendant risks will continue at its
current level. 7 So, without a way to avoid the danger, our focus turns to the
1. On March 16, 1978, the MIVAmoco Cadiz grounded off the Brittany coast of France.
The resulting spill of 68 million gallons impacted approximately 130 miles of French coastline.
The slick was 18 miles wide and 80 miles long. Bartlett, In re Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz-
Choice of Law and a Pierced Corporate Veil Defeat the 1969 Civil Liability Convention, 10 THE
MAR. LAW. 1 (1985); Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, N.Y.L.J., September 7, 1990, at
31, col. 1.
2. On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez crashed into Bligh Reef in Prince William
Sound, Alaska. The spill of eleven million gallons of crude oil coated more than 1,000 miles of
Alaskan coastline. The spill was the worst in United States history. Feder, Exxon Valdez's
Sea of Litigation, N.Y. Times, November 19, 1989, at Fl, col. 3. Rosen, Alaskans Cold to
Judge's Proposal for Spill Payment, THE REUTER Bus. REP., September 17, 1990, at 1.
3. In June 1990 an explosion aboard the Mega Borg supertanker caused a fire that
burned for more than a week in Galveston Bay. Approximately four million gallons of oil
escaped, causing a slick 30 miles long and 10 miles across in some spots. Fortunately, most of
the oil burned off. The potential harm was incredible since the Mega Borg was carrying a total
of 38 million gallons at the time of the explosion. Solomon & Machalara, Troubled Waters: Oil
Tankers' Safety is Assailed as Mishaps Average Four a Week, Wall St. J., June 10, 1990, at Al,
col. I.
4. "Exxon Valdez. Kill Van Kull [shipping channel]. Mega Borg. The names of oil
spills are beginning to carry the kind of emotional charge usually stored in the names of infa-
mous military defeats: Dunkirk, Pearl Harbor, Tet. One mention and most listeners feel a rush
of anger, humiliation, and disappointment. The oil industry in the past 15 months is awash
with such defeats." Nulty, What We Should Do to Stop Spills, FORTUNE, July 16, 1990, at 46.
5. Halkias, Major Oil Companies Hesitate to follow Shell Part Decision, Dallas Morning
News, June 17, 1990 at 28A, col. 1; Nulty, supra note 4, at 46.
6. 136 CONG. REc. Sl 1,544 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
7. Stigler, What an Oil Spill is Worth, Wall St. J., April 17, 1990, at A12, col. 2.
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question of whether the current environmental laws adequately deal with oil
spills and their resulting liability. The United States Congress recently ad-
dressed that question by passing the Oil Pollution Act of 19908 (Act) dealing
with the overall problems of oil spills.
Generally, this Comment will: (1) examine the historical background of
the Act; (2) discuss the problems that existed under the old system; (3) out-
line the provisions of the Act; and (4) discuss whether or not the Act solves
the past problems, introduces new ones or both. All discussions in this
Comment are limited to spills in United States territorial waters.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The history behind the Act will be discussed in two sections - one cover-
ing the historical development of the law, and the other discussing the civil
liabilities of oil spills. The second section will be divided further into four
categories: direct cleanup costs of a spill, damages to natural resources, re-
covery of private citizen's damages, and a miscellaneous category including
a discussion of the various criminal penalties imposed on the party responsi-
ble for the spill.
A. Historical Development
Prior to 1967, liability for maritime accidents in United States waters was
grounded mainly in common law theories of tort-based negligence. 9 The
Limitation of Liability Act of 1851,10 however, applied to all maritime tort
actions when the tort occurred without the shipowner's privity or knowl-
edge.I1 This Act limited an owner's liability to the value of the vessel and
freight aboard. 12 Since these amounts often were minimal, 13 an owner's lia-
bility might be very small. 14 Although the Limitation of Liability Act is
quite old, courts have relied upon it in deciding cases as recently as 1989.15
Before any legislation dealing specifically with oil spill liability existed,
courts used both the Refuse Act of 189916 and the Intervention on the High
8. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (104 Stat.) 484 (enacted August 18, 1990) [hereinafter Oil Pollution Act].
9. Note, Strict Liability Under Section 311 of the Clean Water Act: Cleaning Up Respon-
deat Superior and Negligence, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 159 (1985).
10. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1988).
11. Id. § 183(a).
12. Id. § 183(a).
13. See Note, supra note 9.
14. See id.
15. Esta Later Charters, Inc. v. Ignacio, 875 F.2d 234, 239 (9th Cir. 1989) (mere techni-
cality of procedural timing prevented its application in a personal injury case resulting from a
ship explosion). The judge commented "Misshapen from the start, the subject of later incrus-
tations, arthritic with age, the limitation Act has 'provided the setting for judicial lawmaking
seldom equalled.'" Id. at 239 (quoting Eyer, Shipowners' Limitation of Liability--New Direc-
tions for an Old Doctrine, 16 STAN. L. REV. 370, 374 (1964)).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
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Seas Act 17 in providing remedies to oil spill victims.' 8 These acts are gener-
ally considered outmoded and arguably have been preempted by more recent
statutes. 19
Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 192420 in an attempt to recover
the United States government's reasonable cleanup costs when a spill re-
sulted from the discharger's willful misconduct or gross negligence. 21 The
Oil Pollution Act of 1924 enjoyed only limited success; Congress repealed
the legislation in 1970.22
In 1967, the Torrey Canyon spill in the English Channel shook the
globe.23 The largest oil spill to date,24 Torrey Canyon focused public atten-
tion on the enormous risks oil spills posed to the environment 25 and conse-
quently provided the catalyst for the development of oil spill legislation and
agreements world-wide. 26
Unfortunately, rather than a coherent system, the resulting United States
legislation constitutes a mixed bag of statutes and case law. 27 In 1985, the
president of the Maritime Law Association of the United States reported to
Congress that "the present patchwork of federal and state laws is unwieldy,
inconsistent, inefficient and unnecessarily expensive."' 28 The following dis-
cussion presents the various liabilities surrounding oil tanker spills.
B. Direct Cleanup Costs
Although both statutes and case law use the phrase "direct cleanup costs"
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1471 (1988).
18. Bagwell, Liability under United States Law for Spills of Oil or Chemicals from Vessels,
LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 496, 517-18 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Oil Pollution Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-238, ch. 316, §§ 2-9, 43 Stat. 604-06 (1924),
as amended by Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 21 l(a), 1966 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (80 Stat.) 1246, 1252-53, repealed by Water and Environmen-
tal Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, Title I, § 108, 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat.) 91,113.
21. Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-753, § 211(a) (80 Stat.) 1246,
1252-53.
22. Repealed by Water and Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-224, Title I, § 108, U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (84 Stat.) 91,113.
23. The Torrey Canyon ran aground on March 18, 1967, 15 miles off the coast of England,
on her maiden voyage. The result of the approximately 120,000 tons of crude oil spilled was
widespread pollution of the coasts of both France and England. The fishing industries of both
countries suffered enormous damages. Although the British government estimated it spent at
least two million pounds in dealing with the oil, the British and French governments accepted
three million pounds as full and final settlement of all claims, including private claims which
they had paid. H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 27-1, at 693-94 (3d
ed. 1979); Buglass, The Big Oil Spill: Potential Liabilities v. Available Insurance, DYNAMIC
ASPECTS OF MARINE AND OFFSHORE LIABILITIES, at 111-2 (1978).
24. H. BAER, supra note 23, at 694.
25. Id.
26. Buglass, supra note 23, at 111-2.
27. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 496.
28. Letter from Graydon S. Staring, President, The Maritime Law Association of the
United States, to Hon. Gerry E. Stubbs, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navi-
gation, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 May
31, 1985, cited in Bagwell, supra note 18, at 496.
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quite often29 its exact definition is unclear. Generally, the phrase refers to
the actual cost of containing and removing the spilled oil. 30 Such costs may
include the use of containment booms, oil scrapers, fire control equipment,
oil eating microbes, and the personnel to handle these operations. 31 So far,
the phrase does not include any damage to natural resources such as fish,
wildlife, and public shorelands. 32
1. Direct Cleanup Costs-Federal Statutes
The United States statutory system provides a patchwork of laws applica-
ble to marine pollution.33 Several federal statutes deal specifically with oil
spills, 34 while others are more general in scope. 35 One act focuses exclu-
sively on the Alaskan pipeline. 36
Congress first enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 37
(FWPCA) in 1948.38 The Federal Water Quality Improvement Act legisla-
tion of 1970 greatly amended the FWPCA.39 In 1977, Congress amended
FWPCA yet again, and the legislation became known as the Clean Water
Act (CWA).4°
Simply stated, the CWA prohibits the discharge of oil or hazardous sub-
stances in or on navigable waters.41 The amount of oil the CWA covers is
"such quantities as may be harmful."'42 The meaning of harmful rests on the
sheen test, defined as a "film or sheen upon or discoloration of the surface of
the water."143 The presence of a sheen establishes a rebuttable presumption
of a harmful quantity of oil.44 Courts have strictly interpreted this test, find-
ing harmful as small an amount as thirty gallons.45
The CWA essentially provides for cleanup of discharged oil,46 and autho-
rizes the federal government to remove the oil once it has been discharged. 47
Prior to the 1977 amendments, the federal government's direct cleanup costs
29. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1813 (1988).
30. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st. Cir. 1980).
31. Ohio v. United States Dept. of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
32. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st. Cir. 1980).
33. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 496.
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988); 43 U.S.C. § 1813 (1988).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1988).
36. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-53 (1988). Note that once a statute is discussed, later discussion in
another liabilities category presumes the same provisions for liability limits, available defenses,
and claims.
37. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988). The primary provisions are in § 1321.
38. Act of 30 June 1948 (62 Stat.), 1155. See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 496.
39. Buglass, supra note 23, at 111-6. Congress further amended the FWPCA in 1972. Id.
40. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 496.
41. Id. at 497.
42. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (1988).
43. Discharge of Oil, 40 C.F.R. § 110.3 (1977). The governing regulation also includes
prohibitions of discharges that either violate applicable water quality standards, or those that
result in a sludge under the water's surface or on the adjacent shoreline. Id.
44. United States v. Chevron Oil Co., 583 F.2d 1357, 1363-64 (5th Cir. 1978).
45. United States v. Boyd, 491 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1973).
46. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 500.
47. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1988). The section also provides an exception if the President
determines that the owner or operator of the vessel will properly remove the oil. Id.
1602 [Vol. 44
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constituted the only recoverable damages.48
Liability imposed by the CWA on the responsible owner or operator of a
vessel for removal costs is limited in two ways. 49 First, several defenses al-
low total avoidance of liability for removal costs: 50 act of God; act of war;
negligence by the United States Government; act or omission of a third
party; or any combination of the foregoing.5 1 Courts construe these defenses
quite narrowly. 52
The third party defense is not available if the spill results from the negli-
gence of a compulsory pilot acting under the general supervision of the
ship's master.53 Similarly, the defense is not available to the owner of an oil
barge if the crew of the tug having the barge in tow caused the spill, because
a tug is an independent contractor and not a third party under the CWA.
54
The third party defense, however, may be available for the acts of vandals.55
The existence of a third party who solely caused a discharge does not
remove liability from the owner or operator of a vessel.5 6 Rather, the owner
still must pay the costs incurred by the United States in removing the oil.57
The owner is then entitled, by subrogation, to any recovery the United States
may receive from the third party.58 In addition, the CWA does not affect
any direct recovery available to the owner from the sole-cause third party.5 9
The second limitation on liability is a specific dollar amount.6° For an
inland oil barge, damages are limited to the greater of $125 per gross ton or
$125,000.61 Damages for all other vessels are limited to the greater of $150
per gross ton or $250,000.62 When the discharge is "the result of willful
negligence or willful misconduct within the privity and knowledge of the
owner, ' ' 63 however, the owner or operator of the vessel faces unlimited liabil-
ity for removal costs under the CWA. 64 A finding of unlimited liability de-
pends on the egregious nature of the mistakes involved and the degree of
foreseeability that the harm would occur.65 Where the owner makes several
errors and could have easily foreseen the disaster, full liability exists;66 where
48. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f) (1988). See infra notes 169-75.
49. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988). See Bagwell, supra note 18, at 500-04.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(1) (1988).
51. Id.
52. Schoenbaum, Liability for Spills and Discharges of Oil and Hazardous Substances
From Vessels, XX FORUM 152, 154 (1984).
53. Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 564 F.2d 964, 982 (1st Cir. 1977).
54. United States v. LeBoeuf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 625 F.2d 524, 524 (5th Cir. 1980).
55. Union Petroleum Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 734, 736 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
56. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1988).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(h) (1988).





65. Schoenbaum, supra note 52, at 155.
66. See Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1162 (2d Cir. 1978)
(limitation denied when grounding resulted from accumulation of acts).
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the errors are few or unimportant and the harm is unanticipated, liability
will be limited to the applicable dollar amounts. 67 These same dollar limits,
including their nonapplicability for willful misconduct, apply to sole-cause
third parties as well. 68
Since the CWA does not explicitly preempt prior law, the Limitation of
Liability Act of 185169 arguably limits the CWA. 70 Courts, however, have
rejected this interpretation. Case law holds the CWA preempts other federal
law dealing with recovery of oil spill cleanup costs. 71
The 1977 amendments to the CWA created the National Contingency
Plan (NCP) to aid in planning responses to oil spills.72 The purpose of the
NCP is to minimize cleanup costs. 73 The NCP provides for: assigning duties
among federal agencies; 74 purchasing and storing equipment; 75 establishing
a strike force and the requisite plans to deal with spill removal;76 implement-
ing an early warning system for spill reporting;77 and creating a national
center to direct the contingency plans' implementation. 78
The other major anti-pollution act on the federal level is the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 79
commonly referred to as CERCLA or the Superfund.80 Congress created
CERCLA to deal with hazardous substance cleanup at the federal level.81
CERCLA does not apply to liability for oil tanker spills, however, as its
definition of hazardous substances expressly excludes petroleum products. 82
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 83 of 1978 (OCSLA) excludes in-
land bays and waterways 84 and primarily impacts the Gulf of Mexico. 85
OCSLA provides for joint, several and strict liability8 6 for the owner and
operator of the vessel constituting the source of oil pollution. 87 The damages
67. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979)
(ordinary negligence insufficient liability).
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1988).
69. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1988).
70. Schoenbaum, supra note 52, at 155.
71. See Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 1979); In
re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 340 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1321(c)(2), 9607(a) (1988).
73. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(2) (1988).
74. Id. § 1321(c)(2)(A).
75. Id. § 1321(c)(2)(B).
76. Id. § 1321(c)(2)(C).
77. Id. § 1321(c)(2)(D).
78. Id. § 1321(c)(2)(E).
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988).
80. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 505.
81. Note, Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1464 (1986). The word comprehensive in the title of CERCLA is a bit of a misnomer, as
CERCLA does not deal with compensating victims. Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988). The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) confirmed the exclusion. Pub. L. No. 99-499 (100 Stat.), 1613 (1986). Edelman,
supra note 1, at 3, col 2.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1988).
85. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 513.




cover direct cleanup costs.88 Potential claimants under OCSLA include
both federal89 and state governments. 90 Complete defenses available under
OCSLA include: act of war;9 1 grave natural disaster;92 act of God;93 or a
third party.94
Similar to the CWA, OCSLA limits the dollar liability of an owner and
operator to the greater of $300 per gross ton or $250,000. 95 Again, as under
the CWA, these limits do not apply in the case of willful misconduct or gross
negligence. 96 The limits may also be disregarded if a violation of applicable
federal regulations causes the discharge 97 or if the owner or operator refuses
to aid the federal authorities in cleanup.98
Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of OCSLA is its creation of a fund
financed by fees and lawsuit recoveries.99 A claimant may choose to sue
either the owner, operator, or guarantor of the responsible vessel, or against
the OCSLA fund directly. °° Such an election is irrevocable and provides
the exclusive remedy under OCSLA. 10 1 Recovery under OCSLA bars re-
covery under any other provision of state or federal law.102 The 1977
amendments to the CWA expanded its geographical limits to match OC-
SLA, and the liability limits are greater under the CWA than under OC-
SLA. 10 3 Consequently, claimants have used OSCLA infrequently. 104
Congress passed the Deepwater Port Act'0 5 (DPA) in 1974 to regulate oil
handling facilities beyond U.S. territorial waters.1°6 The DPA provides for
no-fault based joint and several liability10 7 and a dollar limitation of liability
to the lesser of $150 per gross ton or $20 million.' 0 8 As its name implies, the
DPA is limited to discharges from vessels receiving oil from deepwater
ports.° 9 As a result, the DPA has seen limited use, in part because of the
small number of such ports. 110
88. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1) (1988).
89. Id. § 1813(b)(2)-(3),(5).
90. Id. § 1813(b)(3).
91. Id. § 1814(e)(1).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(e)(2) (1988).
95. Id. § 1814(b)(1).
96. Id. § 1814(b). The conduct is required to be within the privity or knowledge of the
owner or operator. Id.
97. Id.
98. 43 U.S.C. § 1814(b)(1) (1988).
99. Id. § 1812.
100. Id. § 1817(c).
101. Id.
102. 43 U.S.C. § 1820(a) (1988).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (1988).
104. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 513.
105. 33 U.S.C. § 1501 (1988).
106. Id. § 1502(10).
107. Id. § 1517(d).
108. Id. The limit does not apply when the cause is gross negligence or willful misconduct
within the privity and knowledge of the owner or operator. Id.
109. 33 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(1) (1988).
110. See Get Oil Out! Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 586 F.2d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 1978).
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The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act"' covers pipeline oil once
it is loaded onto vessels at a pipeline terminal facility. 12 Coverage ceases
when the vessel is offloaded at a United States port. 1 3 Given the usual
range of Alaskan oil tankers, the Act mainly affects west coast states. 114
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act also creates a Pipeline Lia-
bility Fund."I 5 Owners and operators have strict liability, jointly and sever-
ally with the Pipeline Liability Fund, for all damages, including direct
cleanup costs resulting from an oil discharge."16 The available defenses are
minimal, including acts of war or government negligence, but clearly exclud-
ing acts of God or other natural disasters. 1 7
Limitation on liability provisions establish a $14 million ceiling for owners
and operators."" The provisions also provide that the Pipeline Liability
Fund will pay the remaining balance up to $100 million.' 19 Suggesting an
owner's liability is limited, however, would be premature because the Pipe-
line Liability Fund is authorized to recover from the responsible owner any
funds it expends. 120
2. Direct Cleanup Costs-State Statutes
When individual states began enacting their own oil spill legislation, some
questioned whether the federal statutes precluded such legislation.' 2' The
CWA attempted to answer this question by including a provision disavowing
any preemption of state-imposed liabilities or requirements. 122 The Supreme
Court in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.123 finally decided the
issue, holding current federal regulations did not preempt a Florida statute
providing for the state's recovery of cleanup costs. ' 24 Consequently, approx-
imately twenty-four states have since enacted their own oil spill legisla-
111. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55 (1988).
112. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988).
113. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(7) (1988).
114. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 515.
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(5) (1988). Five cents per barrel of oil transported through the
Pipeline goes to the Fund until it reaches $100 million and is subsequently maintained at that
figure. Id.
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988). Unlike OCSLA, more specific definitions of covered
damages are not included.
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(2) (1988).
118. 43 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988).
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (1988). Claims exceeding $100 million are proportionately re-
duced. Id.
120. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(8) (1988).
121. Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil Discharge Situations, 28
U. MIAMI L. REV. 524, 543 (1974).
122. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o) (1988).
123. 411 U.S. 325 (1975).
124. Id. at 329.
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tion.12 5 Nineteen states impose unlimited liability.126 Florida's statute is
illustrative of such state legislation and is examined in detail below.
The Florida legislature enacted Florida's Pollutant Spill Prevention and
Control Act 127 (Florida Act) in 1970.128 The Florida Act generally requires
prompt containment and removal of spills and creates a fund to pay for such
removal. 129 The Florida Act is broader than the CWA in its prohibition of
any discharge, not merely those discharges deemed harmful. 130 The Florida
Act calls for the dischargers to clean up their own spills, and if they do not,
allows for Florida authorities to do so. 13 1 Dischargers who render assistance
in cleanup are eligible for reimbursement of their costs. 132 Further, if the
spill is in United States waters, rather than inland waterways, Florida may
rely on federal funds before using its own. 133
The Florida Act also creates the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund134
(Florida Fund), funded with monies from excise taxes, registration fees, pen-
alties, and judgments imposed on carriers of hazardous substances. 135 The
Florida Fund pays for both enforcement costs 136 and the costs of immediate
stoppage of a spill. 137 Discharger liability includes repayment to the Florida
Fund for all cleanup costs up to the lesser of $100 per gross ton or $14
million.' 38 As with the CWA, a willful discharger's liability is unlimited. 13
9
Defenses to liability under the Florida Act are limited to occasions when the
discharge is caused solely by any one or a combination of: an act of war,
14°
an act of government, 14 act of God, 142 or the act or omission of a third
party. 14 3
Inroads by state statutes into this area continue even today. In September
1990 California's governor signed a bill into law touted as the nation's most
125. Edelman, supra note 1, at 23, col. 1. Recovery under state law takes three different
avenues: (1) statutorily provided arbitral or administrative procedure; (2) bringing suit based
on an explicit provision in a statute for a private right; or (3) bringing suit based on an implicit
provision in a statute. Post, supra note 121, at 539.
126. Statement by Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-Me.) Regarding Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990, Fed. News Service, August 2, 1990, at 2.
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-.17, 376.19-.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
128. See generally Barret & Warren, History of Florida Oil Spill Legislation, 5 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 309 (1977) (outlining the impetus for and legislative history of the Florida oil spill
legislation enacted in 1970).
129. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.021(4)(b) & (c) (West 1988).
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.041 (West 1988).
131. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.09(1) (West 1988).
132. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.09(6) (West 1988).
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.09(2) (West 1988).
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11 (West Supp. 1990).
135. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(2) (West Supp. 1990).
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(4)(a) (West Supp. 1990).
137. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(4)(b) (West Supp. 1990).
138. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
139. Id. The exact language is "such discharge was the result of willful or gross negligence
or willful misconduct within the privity or knowledge of the owner or operator or agent
thereof." Id.
140. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(3)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
141. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(3)(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(3)(c) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
143. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(3)(d) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
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comprehensive oil spill prevention and cleanup plan to date.1 "4 Included in
the statute are provisions for creating a $100 million emergency fund, origi-
nally funded by a twenty-five cent per barrel tax on oil, available for immedi-
ate direct cleanup activities. 45 Spillers are required to reimburse the
emergency fund for the cleanup expenses.' 46 The statute also creates the
position of an oil spill czar. The czar must establish detailed spill prevention
plans.147
3. Direct Cleanup Costs-International Conventions
Various nongovernmental international agreements cover liability for oil
spills. The Tanker Owner's Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for
Oil Pollution 148 (TOVALOP) is a voluntary tanker owner agreement origi-
nally adopted in 1969 to reimburse cleanup costs, whether governmental or
private.149 The vast majority of the world's tanker owners subscribe to
TOVALOP. 150 Although TOVALOP has paid claims based on spills in
United States waters, 51 the agreement is not considered part of United
States law dealing with spills.1 52
The Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for
Oil Pollution' 5 3 (CRISTAL) came into effect in 1971.154 CRISTAL supple-
ments TOVALOP, as cargo owners also subscribe to it.' 55 CRISTAL is
designed to be employed only when other remedies are exhausted, 56 thus
limiting its application. 5 7
The Civil Liability Convention on Oil Pollution Damage5" (CLC) consti-
tutes a set of protocols adopted by the majority of the large maritime na-
tions,159 with the exception of the United States. 16° Effective in 1975,161 the
CLC limited the liability of shipowners to approximately $8.9 million per
incident.162 Also, a separate fund convention is designed to help those oil
144. Gillam, Governor Signs Offshore Spill Cleanup Plan, L.A. Times, September 23, 1990,




148. Becker, Acronyms and Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage From Tankers, 18
TEX. INT'L L.J. 475, 476 (1983) (citing 2 S.H. LAY, R. CHURCHILL & M. NORDQUIST, NEW
DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 641 (1973)).
149. Buglass, supra note 23, at 111-2.
150. Becker, supra note 148, at 476.
151. Id. at 478.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 479.
154. Id. CRISTAL and TOVALOP were both revised in 1978. Id.
155. Buglass, supra note 23, at 111-3.
156. Id. at 111-4.
157. It has been suggested that the oil industry created CRISTAL merely to convince the





161. Becker, supra note 148, at 477.
162. Van Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil Liability
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spill victims not adequately covered by the CLC protocols.163 The total
compensation available from both sources was limited to $47 million. 164
Member nations made substantial amendments in 1984, extending the cover-
age to 200 miles off the coastline and increasing the liability and fund con-
vention limits to $62 million and $208 million respectively. 165 However, the
United States never adopted the CLC protocols, and thus the protocols do
not impact spills in United States' waters. 166
C. Natural Resource Damages
Like direct cleanup costs, most statutes poorly define natural resource
damages. Natural resource damages generally include damages to public
land, fish, wildlife, and marine life. 167 Natural resource damages, however,
do not cover injuries to an individual's real or personal property, such as
boats or piers, or the loss of their use. 168
1. Natural Resource Damages-Federal Statutes
The CWA amendments in 1977 added recovery for the cost of restoring or
replacing natural resources damaged by the discharge of oil, 16 9 without in-
cluding how such damages are to be measured. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe
Colocotroni 170 attempts to create standards for the measurement of natural
resource damages. The statute discussed by the court allowed for recovery
of the total value of the environmental damage.171 Analogizing to the CWA,
the court held that the traditional diminution of value rule was not an appro-
priate measure, and instead awarded the amount necessary to restore the
affected area to its pre-spill condition. 172 Ohio v. United States Department
of the Interior also used the restoration cost standard. 73 The Ohio court
held that the measurement of damages should include restoration costs,
compensation for reliably calculated use values, and other factors.' 74 The
court stated that market value was not the exclusive factor in determining
for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Dam-
ages:A n Option for Needed Reform in United States Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 319, 322 (1988). The
limits are not set in dollars, so the actual figures fluctuate with exchange rates. Id.
163. Edelman, supra note 1, at 22, col 6. The fund's monies are generated by contributions
from persons receiving oil cargoes in member countries. Id.
164. Id.
165. Van Hanswyk, supra note 162, at 320.
166. Id.
167. Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675-77 (1st Cir. 1980).
168. Id.
169. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(4) (1988). "The costs of removal ofoil... shall include any costs
or expenses incurred by the Federal Government or any State government in the restoration or
replacement of natural resources damaged or destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil ......
Id.
170. 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980).
171. P.R. LAws ANN. Tit. 12, § 1131 (1977).
172. 628 F.2d at 675.
173. 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).




Damages recoverable under OCSLA are quite broad, including injury to
or destruction of natural resources, ' 7 6 loss of use of natural resources,177 and
loss of profits or impairments of earning capacity from injury to or destruc-
tion of natural resources.178 The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act's
coverage of all damages resulting from an oil discharge 179 also extends to the
recovery of damages to natural resources. 80
2. Natural Resource Damages-State Statutes
The Florida Legislature created the Florida Act' 8 ' primarily for two rea-
sons: protection of work-related and recreational uses of shorefront prop-
erty, 18 2 and preservation of the general beauty of the Florida coast line.183
Florida's natural resources are thus protected and damages to them are re-
coverable. In addition, the Florida Fund pays for cleanup and rehabilitation
of natural resources.184
3. Natural Resource Damages - Common Law
A state may recover natural resource damages even without applicable
statutes; the state is construed as a representative of the people in the form of
a public trustee.185 Courts have also extended this right of recovery to state
owned lands such as parks.' 8 6 Additionally, courts recognize a compensat-
able right to pollution-free navigable waters. 1 7 Such a right is generally
granted to a state on behalf of its citizens.' 88 This right is based either on the
technical theory that the state owns its waters' 8 9 or on other more straight-
forward policy grounds.19° One state court extended the doctrine to allow
both the tanker company and the oil company to seek relief.191
175. Id. The court felt it incorrect to reduce the value of a forest merely to the board feet
of lumber it contained, or the wildlife to the market value of its hides. Id.
176. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(C) (1988).
177. Id. § 1813(a)(2)(D).
178. Id. § 1813(a)(2)(E).
179. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988). Unlike OCSLA, a more specific definition of covered
damages is not included.
180. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. United States, 649 F.2d 831, 834 (Ct. Cl. 1981); In re
Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (D. Alaska 1990).
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-.17, 376.19-.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.021(3)(b) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
183. Id.
184. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.11(4)(c).
185. Maine v. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1100-01 (D. Me. 1973); In re Steuart
Transp., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980).
186. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1100-01.
187. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. at 1101; Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amer-
ada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066-67 (D. Md. 1972), motion denied, 356 F. Supp. 975
(D. Md. 1973).
188. Id.
189. Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources, 350 F. Supp. at 1066-67.
190. M/V Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973).
191. Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060,
1066 (D. Md. 1972), motion denied, 356 F. Supp. 975 (D. Md. 1973).
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4. Natural Resource Damages-International Conventions
In 1978 the subscribing tanker owners revised TOVALOP extensively to
include strict liability to third parties for pollution damages as a result of a
spill. 192
D. Private Citizens' Damages
Private citizens clearly suffer damage when an oil spill occurs. For in-
stance, property maintained on the water, such as a boat or pier, is often
severely damaged. Real property on the shore is also affected by oil coming
onto the shoreline. Other purely economic harms, such as lost tourism to a
beachfront resort, must be considered as well.
1. Private Citizens' Damages-Federal Statutes
The CWA does not provide for private claims, such as those of fisherman
or shore property owners.193 Damages under OCSLA include injury to re-
alty or personalty, 194 the loss of use of realty or personalty, 195 and the loss of
profits or impairments of earning capacity from injury to or destruction of
realty or personalty.196 OCSLA also provides for an expanded list of possi-
ble plaintiffs with standing. For example, a private citizen may sue to re-
cover loss of profits from damages to natural resources if twenty-five percent
of his or her earnings are from activities using these resources. 197 The
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act provides a right of recovery of all
damages from an oil discharge198 for claimants who are United States or
Canadian citizens. 199
2. Private Citizens' Damages - State Statutes
Many state statutes provide for recovery by private citizens. A few exam-
ples are examined below. The Florida Legislature created the Florida Act2cO
to protect owners and users of shorefront property as well as citizens of Flor-
ida.20 1 Thus, the Florida Act creates a direct right for non-Florida citizens
to recover damages. Individuals suffering damage as a result of a covered
discharge can also recover from the Florida Fund.20 2 Once a claim is paid,
the Florida Fund is subrogated to any cause of action that individuals may
have for the damages. 20 3
192. Becker, supra note 148, at 477.
193. Buglass, supra note 23, at 111-6.
194. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(A) (1988).
195. Id. § 1813(a)(2)(B).
196. Id. § 1813(a)(2)(E).
197. Id. § 1813(b)(4).
198. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (1988). Unlike OCSLA, more specific definitions of covered
damages are not included.
199. Id.
200. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-.17, 376.19-.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
201. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.021(3)(b) (West 1988).




The Maine Legislature originally adopted Maine's oil pollution statute
(Maine Act) 1970.204 Equally as elaborate as Florida's statute, the Maine
Act similarly provides an administrative fund for private clainants. 20 5
In contrast, Washington2°6 and Massachusetts 207 state statutes create an
explicit private right for damages as a result of oil spills, 2°8 but individuals
must use the courts to obtain compensation. 2° 9 Washington's statute pro-
vides the broader coverage of the two, including "damages to persons, or
property, public or private". 210 Massachusetts' statute restricts recovery to
actual physical damage to real or personal property. 211
3. Private Citizens' Damages-Common Law
State and federal statutes allow the recovery of damages for much of the
liability resulting from an oil spill.212 The private citizen's recovery, how-
ever, is still subject to common law. 213 A plaintiff must prove direct dam-
ages to recover. The court in Matter of Lloyd's Leasing Ltd.214 held that
"direct physical impact damages, '215 consisting of damages to the hulls of
boats,216 were required for recovery. 217 Other courts extend compensation
for such damages.218
Damage to affected land also fits in the physical category to a certain de-
gree. In one of the earliest cases, a federal court found compensable the
plaintiff's claims for damages to his beach as a result of oil discharges. 219
Courts have also extended compensable losses to include temporary injuries
such as loss of use and enjoyment of the property for rental purposes.220
Some recovery of such damages, however, is limited. For example, one
court held that damages from tracking oil onto adjacent, non-shore, prop-
204. Oil Discharge Prevention and Pollution Control Act of 1970, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 38, §§ 541-60 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
205. Post, supra note 121, at 540.
206. Washington Water Pollution Control Act, WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 90.48.315-
.336 (Supp. 1990).
207. Massachusetts Clean Waters Act, MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. ch. 21, §§ 26-53 (1988 &
Supp. 1990).
208. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.336 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21,
§ 42 (1988).
209. Post, supra note 121, at 541.
210. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.336 (Supp. 1990).
211. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 42 (1988).
212. See supra notes 29-191 and accompanying text.
213. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) (Federal Water Pollution Control Act creates no private right of action).
214. 697 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
215. Id. at 290.
216. Id.
217. Id. The court relied on Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986).
218. Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th Cir. 1973) (damages to private plea-
sure boats recoverable); Atlantic Pipe Line Co. v. Dredge Philadelphia, 247 F. Supp. 857, 864
(E. D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 366 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1966) (United States allowed recovery for dam-
age to ships in naval basin).
219. Kirwin v. Mexican Petroleum Co., 267 F. Supp. 460, 462 (D.R.I. 1920).
220. In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925, 937 (S.D. N.Y. 1958).
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erty were not foreseeable and thus not compensable.221 Courts have allowed
recovery in cases of private parties with income attributable to sea life, the
paradigm class being fishermen. 222
The harms discussed above generally fit into the category of direct harms,
as some physical impact is required for compensation. 223 Another category
of damages resulting from oil spills is ordinarily referred to as indirect
harms. In the latter case, real damage may have occurred, but no physical
object is directly affected. 224
Loss of tourism is probably the largest single element of the indirect harm
category. Determination of such losses, however, is problematic. Lost tour-
ism and revenues to a beach front hotel's business are easily verified; less
clear is the damage to the restaurant three blocks inland, or the gas station
on the road into town.225
Some cases have wrestled with this uncertainty. In Burgess v. M/V
Tamano,226 plaintiffs included owners of motels, trailer parks, campgrounds,
restaurants, and grocery stores. In dismissing their complaints, the court
noted that recovery required a damage particular to the individual that was
different than that of the public generally.227 Recent case law in this area,
however, is minimal.
E. Miscellaneous Penalties
1. Miscellaneous Penalties-Federal Statutes
The CWA possesses two components that extend beyond cleanup of a
spill.228 First, the CWA imposes on "any person in charge of a vessel" 229 a
duty to report a discharge to the United States government as soon as he or
she learns of it.230 Failure to notify is a misdemeanor, with maximum pun-
ishment a $10,000 fine, up to one year in jail, or both.231
Second, a civil penalty is imposed for each discharge as a separate offense
with a minimum penalty of $5,000.232 In addition, an extra civil penalty of
221. In re Lloyd's Leasing Ltd, 697 F. Supp. 289, 291 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
222. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974) (breach of duty to perform
oil related operations so as to avoid diminution of aquatic life gives rise to loss for fisherman);
Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (commercial fisherman and
clam diggers entitled to recovery).
223. See supra notes 215, 218.
224. Post, supra note 121, at 524.
225. Id. at 525.
226. 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973).
227. Id. at 251.
228. Bagwell, supra note 18, at 499.
229. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)5 (1988).
230. Id. Regulation names the appropriate agency to which the report is to be made. Con-
trol of Pollution By Oil and Hazardous Substances, Discharge Removal, 33 C.F.R. § 153.203
(1990).
231. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)5 (1988). Even if no officer or director of a corporation is aware of
a spill, the corporation may still be found guilty of a failure to notify the agency. Apex Oil Co.
v. United States, 530 F.2d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); United
States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 523 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Hougland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1110, 1116 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
232. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A) (1988).
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up to $50,000 may be imposed for particularly grave offenses, and in the case
of willful misconduct, up to $250,000.233 Also, the federal government has
the power to issue regulations establishing spill prevention and removal
methods.234 Violators of these regulations are subjected to an additional
$5,000 per day penalty. 235
The Deepwater Port Act 236 provides for civil 237 and criminal 238 penalties
for oil spills. Damages available under OCSLA include a unique provision
for recovery by a governmental entity of loss of tax revenue for one year
after injury to realty or personalty. 239
2. Miscellaneous Penalties--State Statutes
Under the Florida Act,24° the discharger faces civil penalties for any viola-
tion of the Florida Act of up to $50,000 per day that the discharge occurs.24 1
In addition, the pilot or master of a vessel who does not notify the authori-
ties of the discharge faces a third degree felony charge. 242
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE STATE OF THE LAW
Clean up cost liability for an oil spill can be enormous. 243 For instance,
liability limits do not apply when the spill can be traced to the fault of an
identifiable party, which is usually the case. 2 " Even if the spilling tanker
was not at fault, adverse public relations may force the offender to initiate a
clean up and attempt to recover its costs later.245 Incredibly, in the after-
math of the Valdez spill, Exxon has already spent over $2 billion in cleanup
costs, natural resource rehabilitation, and other expenses in Prince William
Sound.246 This amount is even more mind-boggling when one considers that
the spill was the world's 21st-largest at the time247 and that litigation costs
have yet to be paid.248 In addition to direct liability for cleanup costs, tanker
owners also can face claims for natural resource damage, private citizen
claims, and the ever present threat of judicially imposed punitive
damages. 249
233. Id. § 1321(b)(6)(B).
234. Id. § 13210)(1).
235. Id. § 1321(j)(2).
236. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1988).
237. Id. § 1517(a)(2).
238. Id. § 1517(b).
239. 43 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(2)(F) (1988).
240. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.011-.17, 376.19-.21 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).
241. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.16(1) (West 1988).
242. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 376.12(7) (West 1988 & Supp. 1990). An additional third degree
felony charge is imposed on a vessel that does not stay in the area for a reasonable time after
the discharge. Id.
243. Nulty, supra note 4, at 48.
244. See supra notes 49-68 and accompanying text.
245. Feder, supra note 2 at F6, col.2.
246. Nulty, supra note 4 at 46.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra notes 29-242 and accompanying text.
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. In the aftermath of the Mega Borg scare during the summer of 1990, Shell
decided to deliver oil to only one United States port on its own tankers.250
The International Association of Tanker Owners argues that without ceil-
ings on liability, only unscrupulous owners, or single ship companies willing
to take the risks, will deliver oil to the United States.251 The potential re-
sults are shocking because if fewer tanker companies transport oil to the
United States, both increased transportation costs, and correspondingly
greater consumer prices, have been predicted.252 Also, with undercapital-
ized and slip-shod firms taking the place of the unwilling major tanker firms,
spill risks increase and less compensation to victims can be expected. 25 3
The efficiency of response to an oil spill also is questionable. Theoreti-
cally, the National Contingency Plan provides a cohesive response to oil
spills,254 thus reducing cleanup costs and any resulting liability, whether
borne by the United States or the discharger. 255 In at least one case, how-
ever, experts agree that the effects of the Exxon Valdez spill worsened dra-
matically due to slow industrial and governmental response, poor
coordination, and no apparent planning. 256
Although cleanup costs remain high, the current system allows govern-
ments to recover their cleanup costs directly under a variety of statutory
schemes or through litigation.257 While such lawsuits are not cheap, govern-
ments can more easily pay for a cleanup and later seek recovery from those
responsible.258 The same is true for natural resource damage, as courts also
seem well on their way to crafting realistic assessments of natural resource
damages.259
The private citizen harmed by an oil spill is not as fortunate and may have
few resources to rely on until a law suit can be resolved. In some states,
statutes provide direct rights to individuals, 260 but no federal statutes are
available in this area. Even when litigation is available, the responsible party
could be judgment proof or unfindable. Finally, a delay in compensation
alone could be devastating. 261
A major problem in leaving private citizen damages to the courts is the
unresolved policy questions regarding such damages. The most prevalent
250. Halkias, supra note 5, at 28A, col. 1.
25 1. Solomon & Lublin, Tanker Fire Raises Serious Questions About Liabilities in Oil Spills
off U.S., Wall St. J., June 12, 1990, at A12, col. 2.
252. Halkias, supra note 5, at 28A, col. 1.
253. Id.
254. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1988).
255. Schoenbaum, supra note 52, at 152-54.
256. Feder, supra note 2, at F6, col. 2.; S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 722 at 724-25
(1990).
257. See supra notes 33-166 and accompanying text.
258. Id.
259. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980).
260. See supra notes 200-11 and accompanying text.
261. After 12 years of litigation, the appellate court decided the Amoco Cadiz case in sum-
mer 1990 which resulted in a $160 million damage award against Amoco. Edelman, supra
note 1, at 3, col 1.
1991] 1615
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
concerns are how widely to compensate damage claims2 6 2 and how to mea-
sure them.26 3
The first question is answerable in many instances. For example, loss of
tourism is a fairly direct and acceptable damage suffered by private par-
ties.264 The problem of quantifying damages, however, remains. Merely
looking at the change in hotel guest occupancy is not particularly accu-
rate.265 Such numbers are clearly affected by other things such as weather,
the economy, and tourist preferences. 266
Compensable damages are not as easily determined in other situations.
Should a bartender in Anchorage be able to make claims for tips he might
have received from fishermen thrown out of work by the Exxon Valdez
spill?267 What about a California driver suing for increased gas prices?26
Such damages are clearly real, but should they be compensable?
Access to damage funds administered by the government and funded by
industry taxes and fines should help all claimants, especially private citizens.
The Maine Act establishes a recovery fund for claimants, providing quicker
and cheaper access to compensation than through the courts.269 Not all
such funds produce such positive results. For example, the Pipeline Liability
Fund's effectiveness is at best debatable. It cannot be tapped until the re-
sponsible owner's liability limits are reached. 270 In the case of a small spill,
the Pipeline Liability Fund will likely be of little help to the claimant. 271 As
of mid-1990, compensation for eligible spills in 1987 and 1989 had yet to be
paid.2 7 2 Apparently, contested claims 273 introduce an adversarial flavor
which considerably slows the claims process. 274
Under the current state of the law are unhappy tanker owners, relatively
protected governments, and frustrated private citizens. The tanker owners,
in the wake of an oil spill, face virtually unlimited liability for cleanup costs
and natural resource rehabilitation. 275 Lengthy litigation with potential lia-
bility to private citizens is also inevitable after most spills.276 No wonder
tanker owners are threatening to leave the United States market. Obviously,
governments want to discourage oil spills. They may have become compla-
cent, however, due to their relatively secure position regarding cleanup costs
262. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Stigler, supra note 7, at A12, col. 2.
266. Id.
267. Feder, supra note 2, at Fl, col. 2.
268. Id.
269. Post, supra note 121, at 540.
270. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(3) (1988).
271. Keener, Fishermen Have Waited Too Long for Spill Compensation, Anchorage Daily
News, July 11, 1990, at C6, col. 3.
272. Id.
273. Id. The Pipeline Fund is paying approximately $1 million per month for its defense
attorneys to deal with claims arising from the 1987 spill in Glacier Bay. Id.
274. Broken Promises-Alyeska Record Shows How Big Oil Neglected Alaska Environment,
Wall St. J., July 20, 1989, at A12, col. 4.
275. See supra notes 37-192 and accompanying text.
276. Stigler, supra note 7, at col. 2.
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and their recovery. 277 Private citizens, on the other hand, face costly and
lengthy litigation, uncertain damages and little, if any, access to oil spill ad-
ministrative funds.278 Under current federal and state laws dealing with oil
spills, many salient issues and problems remain. Congress has reacted by
passing new legislation.279
IV. OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990280 (Act) became law on August 18, 1990.281
The Act, which applies prospectively, 282 is comprehensive legislation
designed to prevent oil spills, improve emergency preparedness and response
capability, and ensure that shippers and oil companies pay the full cost of
spills that do occur.283 Geographic coverage includes all navigable waters of
the United States, up to 200 miles offshore. 28 The bill is long and complex,
with many provisions. Specific elements of the Act are outlined below in the
same four categories of liabilities used earlier in the Historical Background
section.
A. Direct Cleanup Costs
The Act's provisions on removal of oil spills place the federal government
more firmly in charge of all operations, regardless of the discharger's re-
sponse. 28 5 The Executive Branch has the authority to arrange and direct all
governmental and private actions aimed at removal. 286 Furthermore, the
Act requires federal removal when cleanup activities are not proceeding
properly or promptly. 287 The Act also grants the federal government power
to prevent a spill.288 This power extends to the removal and destruction of a
vessel discharging or threatening to discharge. 289
Additionally, private parties are encouraged to aid in the removal of
spilled oil by an exemption from liability for their costs or any damages
resulting from removal. 290 The exemption is total for federal employees act-
ing within their official capacities. 291 However, for other persons, this ex-
emption does not cover gross negligence or willful misconduct,292 personal
277. Nulty, supra note 4, at 48.
278. See supra notes 193-239 and accompanying text.
279. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8.
280. Id.
281. 55 Fed. Reg. iii (1990). The Act was 15 years in the making. Edelman, supra note 1,
at 22, col. 6.
282. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1020.
283. 136 CONG. REC. Sl1,536 (daily ed. August 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Mitchell).
284. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(a).





290. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4201(a). Such costs and damages are instead
charged to the responsible party. Id.
291. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1018(d).
292. Id. § 4201(a).
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injury or wrongful death,293 nor does it extend to responsible parties. 294
Exposure to liability is still limited by a list of available defenses, as under
the CWA. The wholly retained defenses are an act of God,295 an act of
war,296 or any combination of the defenses. 297 Lost is the defense of negli-
gence by the United States government. Perhaps as a substitute, the third
party act or omission defense is now easier to establish.298 Any persons fail-
ing to report the spill,299 cooperate in removal activities, 3° ° or end the threat
of a discharge cannot invoke the defenses.301
The Act raises specific dollar limits on liability to $1,200 per gross ton,
with a maximum of $10 million.302 An interesting addition allows the Presi-
dent to adjust these limits for inflation at least every three years.30 3 Recom-
mendations for additional limit adjustments may be made to Congress at
other intervals. 304 As under the CWA, these limits do not apply in cases
involving gross negligence or willful misconduct.30 5 The limits also do not
apply in the case of a violation of a federal safety standard,3°6 a failure to
report the spill,307 or a failure to cooperate with removal activities.308
One of the most significant changes from the CWA is the Oil Spill Liabil-
ity Trust Fund (Fund),309 which is principally financed by a five cent per
barrel tax on imported and domestic oil.310 The Fund is designed to cover
the removal costs of the federal government, state governments, and uncom-
pensated private efforts. 311 The maximum payout per incident is $1
billion. 312
The Act anticipates claims to the Fund as a secondary measure, with the
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1003(a)(1).
296. Id. § 1003(a)(2).
297. Id. § 1003(a)(4).
298. Rather than proving a third party was the sole cause, the responsible party must es-
tablish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the responsible party: "(A) exercised due
care with respect to the oil concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of the oil
and in light of all relevant facts and circumstances; and (B) took precautions against foresee-
able acts or omissions of any such third party and the foreseeable consequences of those acts or
omissions". Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(a)(3).
299. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1003(c)(1).
300. Id. § 1003(c)(2).
301. Id. § 1003(c)(3).
302. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1004(a)(l).
303. The changes are based on significant increases in the Consumer Price Index. Id.
§ 1004(d)(4).
304. Id. § 1004(d)(3).
305. Id. § 1004(c)(1).
306. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1004(c)(l)(B).
307. Id. § 1004(c)(2)(A).
308. Id. § 1004(c)(2)(B).
309. Id. § 1001(11). Establishment occurred in § 9509 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (1989).
310. 26 U.S.C.A. § 9509 (1989). This tax has been collected since January 1990, a full
eight months before Congress actually passed the Act. Penalties collected from violations of
the CWA are also deposited in the Fund. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4304.
311. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1012(aX4).
312. Id. § 9001(c).
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responsible party as the first line of liability. 31 3 Several exceptions are pro-
vided to this hierarchy. One permits direct presentation of claims to the
Fund if the responsible party refuses to be so designated, 31 4 or cannot be
located.31 5 If the dollar limits of liability are reached, claimants may request
any excess amounts, up to the payout per incident limit, from the Fund. 31 6
States are allowed to make their claims for reimbursement of removal costs
directly to the Fund.31 7 An automatic draw is established for requests from
governmental agencies so they may circumvent the possible adversarial
claims procedure.3 18 Yet another exception provides that claims presented
to responsible parties that are not settled within 90 days may be presented to
the Fund. 31 9 If full compensation is not available from the responsible
party, a claim for the unreimbursed portion may be made to the Fund.320 In
all cases, use of the Fund is not available to claimants whose gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct was responsible for the spill or its damages.32 1
A major goal of the Act is better planning for oil spill responses in an
effort to reduce their impact and ensuing liabilities. 322 Thus, response plan-
ning for removals is to be expanded. Several additions are made to the Na-
tional Contingency Plan323 originally created under the CWA. 324
One such addition is the establishment of Coast Guard strike teams. 32 5
These teams are composed of the people and equipment necessary to carry
out the National Contingency Plan, and a detailed pollution prevention plan,
including protection of fish and wildlife. 326 Second, an early detection and
warning system and procedures for immediate response are added to the
National Contingency Plan.327 Third, the National Contingency Plan will
now include research and development of procedures and techniques for the
most effective identification of spills and removal strategies. 328 Fourth,
every local area having its own Area Contingency Plan will have a desig-
nated Federal On-Scene Coordinator. 329 Finally, an additional procedure is
required to coordinate the Federal On-Scene Coordinators, the Coast Guard
313. Id. § 1013(a). References to "the polluter must pay" permeate the House and Senate
record on the days of passage. 136 CONG. REC. S11,536-48 (daily ed. August 2, 1990); 136
CONG. REc. H6,920-49 (daily ed. August 3, 1990).
314. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at §§ 1013(b)(1)(A), 1014(c)(1).
315. Id. §§ 1013(b)(l)(A), 1014(c)(3).
316. Id. § 1013(b)(1)(B); § 1008(b).
317. Id. § 1013(b)(1)(C).
318. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 722, 731.
319. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1013(c)(2).
320. Id. § 1013(d).
321. Id. § 1012(b).
322. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 722, 731.
323. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4201(c).
324. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1988).







strike teams, and others. 330 These revisions to the National Contingency
Plan are to occur no later than one year from the date of the Act.331
Adding chaos to confusion, the National Response System is created
under the Act as well. 332 It consists of six pieces: (1) the National Response
Unit; (2) Coast Guard District Response Groups; (3) Area Committees and
their Area Contingency Plans; (4) Tank Vessel and Facility Response Plans;
(5) Equipment Requirements and Inspections; and (6) Area Drills. 333
The Act requires the establishment of the National Response Unit in
North Carolina 334 within one year. 335 It is charged with maintaining a com-
puterized list of equipment and other resources available world-wide for
dealing with a spill and providing that list to governmental agencies and the
public. 336 The National Response Unit will administer the Coast Guard
strike teams, and provide technical assistance for the preparation of Area
Contingency Plans, and coordinate Federal On-Scene Coordinators. 337 In
addition, the National Response Unit is responsible for maintaining and re-
viewing all Area Contingency Plans.338
The Act also calls for a Coast Guard District Response Group in each of
the ten Coast Guard districts339 within one year of enactment. 340 All the
Coast Guard personnel and equipment in the district, any additional equip-
ment called for in one of the contingency plans, and an advisory staff will
compose these District Response Groups. 341 The responsibilities of the Dis-
trict Response Groups are very similar to that of the National Response
Unit. They include providing technical assistance for the preparation of
Area Contingency Plans, coordinating Federal On-Scene Coordinators, and
reviewing Area Contingency Plans. 342 In addition, the District Response
Groups are to maintain all Coast Guard response equipment in the
district.343
The Act requires the designation of locations which need their own con-
tingency plans344 within six months.345 Once designated, newly appointed
Area Committees are charged with developing Area Contingency Plans.346
These Area Contingency Plans are to cover all navigable waters and the
adjoining shorelines. 347 The Area Committees are also expected to work
330. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4201(b).
331. Id. § 4201(c).
332. Id. § 4202(a)(1).
333. Id. § 4202(a)(6).
334. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4202(a)(6).
335. Id. § 4202(b)(2).




340. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4202(b)(3).




345. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4202(b)(1)(A).
346. Id. § 4202(a)(6).
347. Id. § 4202(b)(1)(A).
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with state and local officials to coordinate planning of response
procedures. 348
A requirement for Area Contingency Plans is the ability to handle a
worst-case discharge349 from a vessel or other facility. 350 Each plan must
include: a description of the area, including any special features; a specific
listing of the responsibilities of governmental agencies and the discharging
owner in the case of a discharge; a list of the equipment and personnel avail-
able for removal; and details as to how the plan is coordinated with other
response plans.35' Submission for Presidential approval 352 within eighteen
months of passage of the Act 353 is required for all Area Contingency Plans.
All tankers, foreign and domestic, and other oil facilities are required to
submit a plan to the President for dealing with a worst-case actual or
threatened discharge354 within two years after the date of enactment. 355 The
plan must: be consistent with National Contingency and Area Contingency
Plans; identify the tanker person-in-charge during a discharge; ensure that
sufficient private equipment and personnel are available to handle a worst-
case discharge; and include provisions for training, testing, and surprise
drills of personnel and equipment. 356 Approval of such a plan will be a pre-
requisite to the transport and handling of oil. 35 7 Failure to comply with this
requirement subjects the tanker operator to fines.358 However, actions con-
sistent with an approved plan in the case of a discharge does not provide a
defense to liability under the Act. 359
The periodic inspection of removal and containment equipment is re-
quired. 36° In addition, all vessels carrying oil as cargo are required to have
removal equipment on board.361
The last piece of the National Response and Planning System is a provi-
sion for area drills. 362 The Act calls for periodic, unannounced drills in re-
gions with Area Contingency Plans.363 Participation is mandatory and
includes governmental agencies, tanker crews, and private industry.364
348. Id. § 4202(a)(6).
349. Worst-case discharge is defined as: "(A) in the case of a vessel, a discharge in adverse
weather conditions of its entire cargo; and (B) in the case of an offshore facility or onshore
facility, the largest foreseeable discharge in adverse weather conditions." Oil Pollution Act,
supra note 8, at § 4201(b)(4).
350. Id. § 4202(a)(6).
351. Id.
352. Id.
353. Id. § 4202(b)(l)(B).
354. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4202(a)(6).
355. Id. § 4202(b)(4).
356. Id. § 4202(a)(6).
357. Id. A two year grace period is allowed after submission of the plan, and before its
approval, if the tanker has certified that the necessary private personnel and equipment are
available to handle a worst-case discharge. Id.
358. Id. See infra note 439.
359. Id.







In addition to plans aimed at decreasing the cost of a spill once it has
occurred, the Act has many provisions aimed at the prevention of spills. 365
One such provision amends the Coast Guard's procedure for issuing mariner
licenses. The new inclusion requires any individual who is applying for an
officer's license or merchant mariner's documents to make information on
driving violations available. 366 The criminal record of the individual is open
for review as well. 367 The strongest provision requires a drug test before
issuance of a license. 368 All of the above tests and reviews also apply to the
renewal of licenses and documents. 369
Extensions to the rules on suspension or revocation of mariner licenses are
included in the Act. The amendments allow revocation of licenses or docu-
ments if the holder has: violated a marine safety statute; committed an act of
incompetence, misconduct, or negligence; is convicted of an offense that
would prevent the holder from obtaining a license; or has been convicted of
driving violations, such as driving while intoxicated or reckless driving,
within the past three years. 370 Provisions are also included which allow for
drug and alcohol testing on periodic, random, reasonable cause, and post-
accident bases. 371 Issuance of a new license or documents after revocation
requires a showing that the basis for revocation no longer exists and that
such an issuance is not in contravention of good discipline and safety at
sea.
372
More immediate action is available when the administrative procedures
dealing with licensing would be too time consuming.373 Amendments to ex-
isting law allow the next two most senior officers to remove the master or
individual in charge when they reasonably believe he is under the influence
of alcohol or a dangerous drug and thus unable to command.
374
A highly touted prevention measure is the requirement for double hulls on
vessels, foreign and domestic, carrying oil in United States waters.375 An
exception is provided for vessels smaller than 5,000 gross tons as long as
they have an approved double containment system. 376 The requirement ap-
plies immediately to all new vessels. 377 Phase-in starts in 1995 with tankers
forty years old. 378 By the year 2010, no tanker with a single hull will be
allowed to operate. 379 A five year extension, until 2015, is given for tankers
365. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at §§ 4101-4118.
366. Id. §§ 4101(a) & (b).
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at §§ 4101, 4102.
370. Id. § 4103(b).
371. Id. § 4103(a)(1).
372. Id. § 4103(c).
373. Id.
374. Id.




379. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4115(a).
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with a double bottom or sides. 380 The Act holds out an extra carrot for
compliance by providing, under the Federal Ship Financing Fund, guaran-
tees for owners' loans necessary for conversion. 38' Interestingly, the Act
provides that, if technology generates a safer alternative, the double-hull re-
quirement can be over-ridden.38 2
Various standards dealing with the staffing requirements of a vessel are
promulgated. Crews are restricted to a maximum of fifteen hours of work in
any twenty-four hour period or thirty-six hours in any seventy two hour
period. 383 Also, the Coast Guard is to create rules determining when and
where vessels may operate on auto-pilot or with an unattended engine
room. 384 In addition, a study is commissioned to investigate crew sizes,
qualifications and training, plus new navigational aids.
385
Foreign vessels don't escape the Act either. The Coast Guard is author-
ized to investigate crew standards of foreign vessels on a periodic basis and
any time the vessel is involved in an accident. 386 If the determination is that
the crew standards of the country of license are not at least as strict as those
of the United States, all tankers with documentation issued from that coun-
try will be denied entry to the United States until the standards are up-
graded. 387 Provisional entry, on a ship-by-ship basis, can be granted to
vessels establishing adequate safety standards or in cases of emergency. 388
Specific provisions are made for pilotage under the Act. Licensed pilots
are required for passage on portions of the Great Lakes 389 and in Prince
William Sound. 39° The Coast Guard is to designate the areas where tankers
must be accompanied by at least two tugs.
39 1
Various additional safety standards are adopted as well. These include
establishing minimum hull thicknesses 392 and standards for tank level and
pressure monitoring. 39 3 Participation in the Coast Guard's Vessel Tracking
Service is now mandatory.394 The Coast Guard will study the possibility of
creating tanker-free zones, where tankers would be prohibited, or at least
limited. 395
380. Id.
381. Id. § 4115(f)(2).
382. Id. § 4115(e).
383. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4114(b).
384. Id. § 4114(a).
385. Id. § 411 l(b).
386. Id. § 4106(a).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4108(a).
390. Id. § 4116(a).
391. Id. § 4116(c). Designated areas include Prince William Sound, Alaska, and Rosario
Strait and Puget Sound, Washington. Id.
392. Id. § 4109.
393. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4110.
394. Id. § 4107. Participation was voluntary before passage of the Act. The National
Transportation Safety Board determined that the absence of an effective Vessel Tracking Ser-
vice system served as one of the major causes of the Exxon Valdez spill. Edelman, supra note
1, at 23, col. 1.
395. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 411 l(b)(7).
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Some miscellaneous provisions of the Act attempt to connect it with other
existing laws. For the most part, however, the Act emasculates other federal
statutes aimed at oil spills. Any application of the Clean Water Act to liabil-
ity of the responsible party, the third party, or recovery of removal costs is
specifically superseded by the Act.3 9 6 The Fund is available both to carry
out what remains of the CWA and to act as a depository for any funds re-
ceived under the CWA. 397
The Deepwater Port Act is largely left intact. Any monies collected under
the Deepwater Port Act, including those retained in its Deepwater Port Lia-
bility Fund, are, however, likewise to be deposited in the Fund.398 All out-
standing liabilities of the Deepwater Port Liability Fund are assumed by the
Fund.
3 9 9
Drastically affected is the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. All of its
provisions dealing with oil spills are repealed. 4 ° The Fund takes over any
monies left in the Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund and assumes
all of its liabilities. 40 1
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System provisions dealing with discharge of oil
from vessels loaded at its terminals are also repealed. 40 2 Likewise, the por-
tion of that legislation establishing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund
is repealed. 40 3 Interestingly, rather than simply turning over the Pipeline
Liability Fund's monies to the Fund, a reserve estimated to be sufficient to
pay outstanding claims is kept, with the balance turned over to the Fund.404
Effective retroactively, a broad definition of damages is added to the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act,4 ' 5 apparently aimed at compensating lo-
cal governments for losses due to cleanup of the Exxon Valdez spill.406 Also
added is an expeditious payment clause, requiring the Pipeline Liability
Fund to pay claims not settled within 90 days of their presentation to the
owner of the discharging vessel. 40 7
The Act specifically supersedes the Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 as
it relates to oil discharges or prevention of such discharges.40 8
Once again, Congress chose not to adopt any existing international proto-
cols such as those of the CLC. The Act concedes that it is in the best inter-
ests of the United States to participate in an international system for liability
and compensation due to oil pollution.409 However, Congress felt that for
396. Id. § 2002(a).
397. Id. § 2002(b)(5).
398. Id. § 2003(b).
399. Id.
400. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 2004. Congress repealed 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1824.
Id.
401. Id.
402. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 8102(a)(1).
403. Id.
404. Id. § 8102(a)(2)(A).
405. Id. § 8102(c).
406. 136 CONG. REC. H6,945 (daily ed. August 3, 1990) (statement of Cong. Young).
407. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 8102(d).
408. Id. § 1018(c).
409. Id. § 3001.
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the United States to participate, such a scheme must be at least as effective as
current federal and state law.4 10 A small bone was thrown in providing for
Presidential encouragement of an international inventory of personnel and
equipment available for spill removal.411 The Act does call for a review of
existing agreements with Canada dealing with oil discharges on the Great
Lakes and Lake Champlain to determine if any amendments or revisions are
needed. 412
B. Natural Resource Damages
Under the Act the provisions for damages are quite specific. The responsi-
ble party is liable for the following categories of damages: natural re-
sources;4 13 subsistence use;414 revenues; 4 15 and profits and earning
capacity. 416
Natural resource damages are only recoverable by governmental or Indian
tribe trustees and not private citizens.417 The damages include injury to,
destruction of, loss of, or loss of use of natural resources.418 The Act also
defines the methodology for calculating natural resource damages. The mea-
sure is (A) "the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the
equivalent of, the damaged natural resources; (B) the diminution in value of
those natural resources pending restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of
assessing those damages. '419 The trustees are to assess damages and develop
and implement a plan for restoration of the natural resources. 420 The rea-
sonable costs of assessing the injury, destruction, or loss of the natural re-
sources are recoverable. 421 Revolving trust accounts, whose use is restricted
to the trustees' costs incurred in carrying out their responsibilities under this
Act will hold all recovered natural resource damages.422
Additional measures of damages related to natural resources are included
in the provisions for subsistence use and revenues. Whether such resources
are injured, destroyed or lost, recovery is available for subsistence use, re-
gardless of who owns or manages the resources.423 The revenue measure-
ment of damages allows governmental entities to recover for their lost taxes,
rents, fees, or royalties due to damages to natural resources.424
The profits and earning capacity provision allows recovery by any claim-
410. Id.
411. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 3004.
412. Id. §§ 3002, 3003.
413. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
414. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(C).
415. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(b)(2)(D).
416. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E).
417. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
418. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A).
419. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1006(d)I.
420. Id. § 1006(c).
421. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(A). The standard to be used is defined in Ohio v. United States Dep't
of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 462-80 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See discussion, supra notes 173-75.
422. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1006(f).




ant for loss of profits or impaired earning capacity due to damages to natural
resources.425 This provision is a route for recovery by fishermen of their lost
income due to damaged fishery resources.426
The Fund's potential uses include the payment of costs to assess natural
resource damages and to create and implement plans to rectify those dam-
ages,427 plus the payment of claims for uncompensated damages.4 28 The
payout per incident is limited to $500 million for natural resource
damages.429
C. Private Citizens' Damages
Under the Act, the responsible party is liable for the following damages:
injury to real or personal property, 430 lost revenues, lost profits and impair-
ment of earning capacity. 431 The Fund may potentially pay for such dam-
ages, if they are not available directly from the responsible party.432
Property damages include injury to, or economic losses resulting from, de-
struction of such property.433 Generously, lessees, rather than merely prop-
erty owners, can recover directly. 434
The provisions for revenues, profits and earning capacity also deal with
property damage. The revenue measurement allows governmental entities
recovery for their lost taxes, rents, fees, or royalties due to damages to real or
personal property.43" The profits and earning capacity is a similar provision,
allowing recovery by any claimant for loss of profits or impaired earning
capacity due to damages to real or personal property.436
D. Miscellaneous
The Act depends on the CWA's prohibition of discharge, but increases the
resultant penalties. The maximum penalty for a discharge is now $25,000
per day or $1,000 per barrel of oil.437 If the spill was a result of gross negli-
gence or willful misconduct the penalty is not less than $100,000 and not
more than $3,000 per barrel of oil. 438 Penalties for failure to comply with
Presidential regulations are raised to $25,000 per day.439 Additional penal-
ties are now imposed for failure to remove the discharge when so ordered.440
425. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(b)(2)(E).
426. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 781.
427. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1012(a)(2).
428. Id. § 1012(a)(4).
429. Id. § 9001(c)(2).
430. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(B).
431. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(b)(2)(E).
432. Id. § 1012(a)(4).
433. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(B).
434. Id.
435. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1002(b)(2)(D).
436. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(E).
437. Id. § 4301(b).
438. Id.
439. Id. See supra notes 354-61 and accompanying discussion.
440. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4301(b).
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These penalties are a maximum of $25,000 per day or three times the costs
incurred as a result of the refusal. 44
The duty to report a spill is likewise retained with increased penalties.
The maximum penalty is raised to $250,000 for an individual or $500,000 for
a corporation. 442 A penalty of imprisonment for up to five years may also be
imposed.4 4 3
A number of other penalties under existing marine transportation safety
laws are also increased. 4" Included are penalties for negligent operation of
a vessel445 and penalties under the Deepwater Port Act,4 6 the Intervention
on the High Seas Act,44 7 and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act.448
The Act establishes an additional category of damages referred to as pub-
lic services.449 Public services damages are related to neither property or
natural resources. Rather, that provision is designed to allow local or state
governments to recover for the costs of providing increased or additional
fire, police, and other health and safety services.450 The time period covers
both during and after removal activities.45!
Finally, the Fund is available for payment of administrative, operational,
and personnel costs for the enforcement of the Act.452
V. EFFECT OF THE ACT
Does the Act solve the problems that existed in the United States under
previous law? Does it introduce any new problems? Given the Act's incipi-
ency, educated guessing and general predictions are the best tools available
to answer these questions.
Federal and state governments were in a fairly good position before the
Act.453 Recovery, under the Act, of lost taxes and extra services for govern-
mental entities,454 and providing states with an automatic draw from the
Fund for cleanup costs455 is merely icing on their cake.
Private citizens, on the other hand, were not as well situated.456 The
Act's inclusion of specific compensable damages for private citizens im-
proves that situation. Private citizens now have a basis for direct presenta-
441. Id.
442. Id. § 4301(a)(2).
443. Id. § 4301(2).
444. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 4302.
445. Id. § 4302(a).
446. Id. § 4302(m).
447. Id. § 4302().
448. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 43020).
449. Id. § 1002(b)(2)(F).
450. Id.
451. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 653, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 781.
452. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1012(a)(5).
453. See supra notes 33-192 and accompanying text.
454. See supra notes 435, 449-51 and accompanying text.
455. See supra note 318.
456. See supra discussion notes 193-227.
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tion of their claims to the responsible party.457 Private citizens are provided
with another route to compensation in the Fund. The provision for presen-
tation to the Fund of claims not settled within ninety days458 by the respon-
sible party should speed up damages recovery. If no relief is available under
those two avenues, at least the Act's damages provisions should reduce un-
certainty in litigation.
If the existing problems with payment of claims under the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Liability Fund are repeated, the new provisions involving the Fund
will be of little help. Ominously, the Senate presumed that the claims proce-
dure will be adversarial. 459 To cut both administrative and claimant costs,
such adversarial attitudes must be kept to a minimum. A provision for expe-
ditious payout is not included, but would provide additional protection for
private citizens.
Given the ineffective response to the Exxon Valdez spill, 46° improved
planning is very important. The National Contingency Plan amendments
are fairly ambitious.461 Putting equipment and designated personnel closer
to potential spills will cut response time. The National Response Unit provi-
sions, such as Coast Guard strike teams,462 should also help with rapid re-
sponse. Of course, the real question is whether this will be any better than
what was called for in the 1977 Clean Water Act. Providing for funding of
the National Contingency Plan out of the Fund may make the necessary
difference.
Requiring oil spill response plans both from areas likely to experience a
spill 463 and from tankers464 should help minimize spill costs as well. Testing
these plans with random drills465 should ensure their vitality. The down side
is the additional cost for tanker owners to create their plans and participate
in drills and the federal government's coordination of it all. Another cau-
tionary eyebrow is raised by the rapid timing demanded. The quality of
plans drawn up in only one year is questionable.
If all of the planning called for is implemented, other problems may be
created. With district groups, area groups, strike teams, on-scene coordina-
tors, and an overall coordinator, 466 perhaps too much planning and re-
sponse is called for. The Coast Guard is burdened with many new
responsibilities, maybe more than it can handle. Moreover, the Fund is to
pay for all of this, perhaps impacting the amount of money available for spill
compensation.
The prevention provisions of the Act explore new territory. On the one
457. See supra discussion notes 430-36.
458. See supra discussion notes 319-21.
459. S. REP. No. 94, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 731.
460. Nulty, supra note 4, at 48; Edelman, supra note 1, at 3, col. 1.
461. See supra discussion notes 323-31.
462. See supra discussion notes 334-38.
463. See supra notes 344-53.
464. See supra notes 354-59.
465. See supra notes 362-64.
466. See supra notes 325-53.
1628 [Vol. 44
COMMENT
hand, the provisions on crew standards,467 and the teeth behind them in the
way of fines and bans on foreign tankers from countries with standards less
stringent than those of the United States,468 should have a substantial im-
pact. The double hull requirement, 469 and the allowance for any better tech-
nology that may be developed,470 should prove equally valuable. On the
other hand, from the tanker owner's point of view, this is all quite
expensive.471
The Act does not preempt state statutes; they remain in effect. During
Congressional floor discussion, much ado was made about continuing to let
states enforce their own, sometimes stricter, standards. 472 California's pas-
sage of an oil spill bill,473 in the month following passage of the Act, indi-
cates states still feel their statutes are necessary. The problem is that such
statutes leave tanker owners subject to requirements that vary as they cross
state lines. This myriad of regulation hampers shippers' abilities to maxi-
mize efficiency and economics and- still have logistically feasible opera-
tions.474 The cost of determining the applicable regulations, complying with
them, and purchasing insurance to cover absolute liability is prohibitive.475
Another potential problem with continued existence of state statutes is
coordination of benefits when a state fund and the Oil Spill Liability Trust
Fund would both cover costs. The Act does not allow double recovery from
the Fund but does not deal with double recovery from the Fund and another
separate fund.4 76 Provisions prohibiting double recovery and establishing a
payout hierarchy are needed.
Tanker owners face another obstacle when their vessels move between
ports. Tanker oil spill response plans must be consistent with all Area Con-
tingency Plans, 477 which means different responses for different ports. The
same is true for the proper equipment required on board.478 The definition
of proper will undoubtedly change between warm and cold water ports, like
Alaska and Texas, as oil behaves differently at different temperatures.479
The increased fines for discharge,480 and reduced defenses under the
467. See supra notes 365-74, 383-85.
468. See supra notes 386-88.
469. See supra notes 375-81.
470. See supra note 382.
471. Edelman, supra note 1, at 23, col. 2. The Exxon Valdez cost $125 million to build; a
double hull would cost 10-15% more. Retrofitting the 153 U.S. tankers could cost about $30
million each, or a total cost of more than $4 billion. Id.
472. 136 CONG. REC. S11,536-48 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990); 136 CONG. REc. H6,920-49
(daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990).
473. See supra notes 144-47.
474. Post, supra note 121, at 547.
475. Id.
476. Oil Pollution Act, supra note 8, at § 1012(i).
477. See supra notes 434-59.
478. See supra notes 350-61.
479. T. POST, PRIVATE COMPENSATION FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED BY THE DISCHARGE
OF OIL FROM VESSELS ON THE NAVIGABLE WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES 10 (Sea Grant
Technical Bulletin No. 22, 1971).
480. See supra notes 437-48.
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Act,4 81 are presumably designed to provide additional deterrence. It is not
clear, in the wake of Exxon facing a $2 billion plus bill, that additional deter-
rence is necessary. Arguably, this is merely a meaningless additional burden
on tanker owners.
The Act does not preempt common law access to other damages.482 This
is certainly good for the tort lawyer interested in developing new theories of
damages. On the other hand, it is a frightening prospect for oil tanker
owners.
Congress chose not to adopt any international protocols.48 3 Arguably,
that weakens the effect of existing protocols without a large nation like the
United States involved. 484 Higher liability exposure for tanker owners here
diminishes the incentive for foreign tankers to come to the United States.4 85
The refusal to adopt international protocols is also narrow-minded. There is
no guarantee of no effect on the United States or its residents, just because a
spill is not in United States waters.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fifteen years in the making and unanimously approved,4 86 the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990 has a lot of hopes riding on it. The increases in liability
limits, types of damages, and pre-spill planning should be good for claim-
ants. The pre-spill planning and prevention activities should be good for all.
It is always cheaper to clean up quickly or not spill at all.
The Fund is probably the most important part of the Act. It is directly
funded out of sure money since collection of the earmarked tax started eight
months before passage of the Act. However, the Fund must pay for many
activities including planning, prevention, and potential damage payments.
Unfortunately, the United States may have left itself open to fewer foreign
tankers wanting to comply, especially in the face of a growing myriad of
state regulations.
481. See supra notes 295-301.
482. See supra notes 396-408.
483. See supra notes 409-10.
484. Van Hanswyk, supra note 162, at 325.
485. Schoenbaum, supra note 52, at 159.
486. 136 CONG. REc. S11,547 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1990). 136 CONG. REc. H6,949 (daily ed.
Aug. 3, 1990).
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